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We study the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment in 17 OECD economies 
through a VAR analysis with annual data from 1960 to 2014. From impulse response 
functions we find that public investment had a positive growth effect in most countries, and a 
contractionary effect in Finland, UK, Sweden, Japan, and Canada. Public investment led to 
private investment crowding out in Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Canada, Sweden, the UK and 
crowding-in effects in the rest of the countries. Private investment has a positive growth effect 
in all countries; crowds-out (crowds-in) public investment in Belgium and Sweden (in the rest 
of the countries). The partial rates of return of public and private investment are mostly 
positive. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2008-2009 financial and sovereign debt crisis led to a substantial drop in both GDP 
and investment levels and growth rates. Moreover, it led to substantial changes in economic 
policy, namely budgetary policy. Under budgetary duress, the level of government 
indebtedness is deemed to have a negative impact on public investment in EMU member 
countries (see, for instance, Turrini, 2004, for the cases in the 1980s and in the 1990s). In fact, 
the abovementioned changes took in several countries the form of reduced expenditure, 
including public investment, and increased taxation. It is expectable that these changes may 
well constitute a policy regime change with structural implications on previous estimations 
regarding the relevance of investment for long-term growth.  
Additionally, such policy changes, and especially in countries following adjustment 
programs, came with an emphasis on structural reforms that concern public spending levels 
and structure, and more generally, the way the economy and markets operate. It becomes then 
important to test if macroeconomic efficiency changes effectively occurred, and in what 
direction. For instance, Afonso and Jalles (2015) argue that the relevance of fiscal 
components differs for private and public investment developments. 
Understanding and measuring linkages between public and private investment and 
economic growth are of crucial importance both in developed economies and emerging 
markets. Public investment is a part of public expenditure and decisions are taken within the 
larger framework of public finance. At the same time, it constitutes an addition to public 
capital. The latter, together with private and human capital, labour and other inputs, is in 
several approaches considered as a production factor. Public investment may therefore be 
linked to growth prospects. However, and as it is well documented in the literature, as part of 
public expenditure, it may crowd other types of investment, namely private, so that in some 
circumstances the net impact of public investment on GDP may be negative (see, for instance, 
Dreger and Reimers, 2014, Cavalcanti, et al., 2014, IMF, 2014). 
At the same time, note the importance of public investment in the fiscal surveillance 
mechanisms of the EU, where nº 3 of Article 126 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU, 
2012) reads: 
 
“If a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these criteria, the 
Commission shall prepare a report. The report of the Commission shall also take into 
account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and 
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take into account all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and 
budgetary position of the Member State”,  
 
which indicates the preference for some Golden Rule based approach for public investment. 
Moreover, the EC (2015) presented a new Investment Plan for Europe in support of its 
investment, structural reforms and fiscal responsibility strategy. Once more, the emphasis on 
investment is stressed, and a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is created to 
promote the European Commission's Investment Plan for Europe, where it is mentioned that 
“co-financed expenditure should not substitute for nationally financed investments, so that 
total public investments are not decreased.” 1 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by using a VAR analysis for 17 OECD 
countries between 1960 and 2014 to assess the effects of public and private investment in 
terms of economic growth, crowding out and crowding in effects. In that context, we also 
compute public and private investment macroeconomic rates of return, and assess the 
potential effect of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, by comparison with previous 
shorter time span research, obtained before the crisis.  
Our analysis provides notably the following results: public investment had a positive 
growth effect in most countries, and a contractionary effect on output in Finland, UK, 
Sweden, Japan, and Canada; positive public investment impulses led to  private investment 
crowding-out in Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Canada, Sweden, the UK and crowding-in effect 
on private investment in the rest of the countries; private investment had a positive growth 
effect in all countries; private investment crowds-out public investment in Belgium and 
Sweden and crowds-in public investment in the remainder of the countries. 
Moreover, the partial rate of return of public investment is mostly positive and the partial 
rate of return of private investment is only negative in Greece and marginally in Belgium. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the literature and 
previous results. Section 3 outlines the analytical framework.  In Section 4 we present and 




                                                          
1 Regarding the so-called Juncker plan Le Moigne et al. (2016) argue, in the context of an estimated DSGE 
model of the Eurozone economy, that it would have had a positive growth impact if it had been implemented at 
the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis. 
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2. Literature 
There are several techniques and results that allow for crowding in and crowding out 
effects of public investment (see Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009, 2010). Namely, and within a 
vector auto regression analysis, different rates of return are estimated. The total investment 
rate of return takes into account both private and public investment costs, while a partial rate 
of return only considers public investment as compared to GDP returns. 
In Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009, 2010), the extent of crowding  in or crowding out of both 
components of investment was assessed and the associated macroeconomic rates of return of 
public and private investment for each country were computed from impulse response 
functions. Results showed the existence of positive effects of public investment and private 
investment on output. Crowding in effects of private investment on public investment were 
more generalized then the reverse case.  
These regularities are likely to be affected by major policy changes after 2009, namely 
due to the financial and sovereign debt crisis. In this project we intend to make further 
progress in this area of research, namely by studying the impact of the recent financial and 
sovereign debt crisis on the linkages between public and private investment and economic 
growth.  
IMF (2015) documents the private investment contraction in advanced economies during 
and after the economic and financial crisis. The “overall weakness of economic activity” is 
found to be the most important factor accounting for this shrinking. Our empirical modelling 
clearly encompasses this important channel, as private investment may react 
contemporaneously and/or with lags to GDP, to public investment, to taxes and to interest 
rates. 
Some recent research provides evidence that more stringent financial conditions affect 
both how the economy reacts to public spending and investment and how investment 
responds to the economy. For the specific case of Japan, and using panel data techniques, 
Brückner and Tuladhar (2014) show that financial distress has a significant negative effect on 
the local government spending multiplier, while economic slack has a positive effect. For 
instance, Abiad et al. (2015) for 17 OECD economies report, via model simulations, that 
increasing public investment increases real growth and has a crowding-in effect on private 
investment. 
In addition, and in the same vein, but also with a VAR methodology Dreger and Reimers 
(2014) refer that, and in what concerns the euro area, public investment decreases could have 
adversely affected private investment and GDP. In an interesting variation, Xu and Yan 
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(2014) study crowding in and crowding out effects in China. They also resort to VAR 
analysis, and divide public capital formation in investment in public goods and infrastructure 
provision and investment involved in the private goods. Results suggest that the first crowds 
in private investment while the latter leads to crowding out. 
The reader may also refer to our earlier work for further references on this subject.  
Pereira (2000) introduced the estimation of macroeconomic rates of return for public 
investment. His VAR-based methodology was further developed by Pina and St. Aubyn 
(2005, 2006), who proposed the distinction between a partial and a total-cost rate of return. 
This research team, in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009, 2010), estimated these rates of return for 
industrialized countries and also computed private investment rates of return, and extended 
previous research by considering a more complete VAR, by computing confidence bands and 
by generally presenting more detailed explanations and results. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
 
The VAR model 
We estimate a five-variable VAR model for each country throughout the period 1960-
2014 using annual data. As in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2010), where more detailed 
explanations may be found, we include five endogenous variables: the logarithmic growth 
rates of real public investment, Ipub, real private investment, Ipriv, real output, Y, real taxes, 
Tax, and real interest rates, R.  
The VAR lag length is determined by the usual information criteria. 
The VAR is identified by means of a Cholesky decomposition. Variables are ordered from 
the most exogenous variable to the least exogenous one, public investment being the “most 
exogenous”. By construction, structural shocks to private investment, GDP, taxes and the real 
interest rate affect public investment with a one-period lag. Private investment responds to 
public investment in a contemporaneous fashion, and to shocks to  other variables with a lag. 
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ε ε ε ε ε ε ≡    contains the reduced form OLS residuals. 
The lag length of the endogeneous variables, p, will be determined by the usual information 
criteria. 
 
Macroeconomic rates of return 
We compute four different rates of return: r1, the partial rate of return of public 
investment; r2, the rate of return of total investment (originated by an impulse to public 
investment); r3, the partial rate of return of private investment; r4, the rate of return of total 
investment (originated by an impulse to private investment). 
These rates are derived from the VAR impulse response functions, as explained in 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009). In the following lines we provide the economic interpretation 
to these variables.  
The partial rate of return of public investment, r1, compares a (partial) cost, public 
investment, to a benefit, GDP change, following an impulse to public investment.  
The rate of return of total investment (originated by an impulse to public investment), 
r2, compares the total cost (public plus induced private investment), to the same benefit, GDP 
change. If more public capital induces more private investment, we will call this a crowding 
in case, and r1 will exceed r2. Moreover, if a positive impulse in public investment leads to a 
private investment decrease, than r1 will be smaller than r2. 
In some cases a positive impulse to public investment will lead to a decrease in GDP. In 
those occasions it will not be feasible to compute a rate of return. Note that a negative rate of 
return will arise when the benefits, albeit positive, are smaller than costs.  
The rates of return r3 and r4 concern the measurement of consequences to positive 
impulses in private investment. As in the case of public investment impulses, we may have 
that private investment leads to the crowding in of public investment, or else that government 
reacts to private investment impulse by diminishing capital formation (the crowding out case). 
In the latter case, r3 will be smaller than r4. The detailed analytics of the computation of the 







4. Empirical analysis 
 
Data set 
We use annual data for 14 EU countries (sample in parenthesis): Austria (1965–2014), 
Belgium (1970–2014), Denmark (1971–2014), Germany (1970–2014), Finland (1961–2014), 
France (1970–2014), Greece (1973–2014), Ireland (1971–2014), Italy (1970–2014), the 
Netherlands (1969–2014), Portugal (1981–2014), Spain (1979–2014), Sweden (1971–2014), 
the UK (1970–2014), plus Canada (1964–2004), Japan (1972–2014), and the United States 
(1961–2014).  
In order to control for the beginning of the 3rd stage of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, and the launching of the euro, on the 1st of January 1999, we have used a dummy 
variable that takes the value one from 1999 onwards inclusively. Such variable is statistically 
significant in several countries, notably regarding the long-term interest rate.2 
 Table 1 summarises the country-specific investment series while Figure 1 plots the 17 





In order to estimate our VAR for each country, we use information for the following 
data series: GDP at current market prices; price deflator of GDP; general government gross 
fixed capital formation at current prices, used as public investment; gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) of the private sector at current prices, used as private investment; taxes 
(including direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions); nominal long-term interest 
rate and the consumer price index. 
GDP, taxes and investment variables are used in real values using the price deflator of 
GDP and the price deflator of the GFCF of the total economy.3 A real ex-post interest rate is 
computed using the consumer price index inflation rate. All data are taken from the European 
Commission Ameco database.4 
                                                          
2 To control for the reunification process a dummy was also used for the case of Germany in 1991.  
3 Due to the lack of information on a price deflator for private investment, we use the same deflator to compute 
both public and private investment variables. 
4 The data sources are mentioned in Appendix 2.  
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All variables enter the VAR as logarithmic growth rates, except the interest rate, where 
first differences of original values were taken. Moreover, the first differenced variables are 




Crowding-out and crowding-in effects 
Figures 2 and 3 show the impulse response functions from a one standard deviation 
shock to public investment and to private investment, respectively for the cases of Portugal 
and Ireland, as an illustration. It is clear from these charts that a public investment shock may 
have a different impact on private investment, implying a crowding-in effect in Portugal and 





Table 3 summarises the results for the long-run elasticities, the marginal productivity 
rates and the macroeconomic rates of return, partial and total, for both public and private 




Figure 4 displays on the vertical axis the marginal effects of public investment on 
private investment, allowing the assessment of the existence of crowding-in or crowding-out 
effects of public investment on private investment. As Figure 4 shows, public investment has 
a positive growth impact in 12 countries and negative one on 5 countries (Finland, UK, 
Sweden, Japan, and Canada). Moreover, public investment has a crowding-in effect on private 
investment in 11 of the 17 countries analysed. Of the six countries in which public investment 
crowds-out effect on private investment, two (Belgium and Ireland) experience a slight output 






In a similar way we report in Figure 5 the effects of private investment on output and the 
existing crowding-in or crowding-out effects of private investment on public investment. 
Moreover, it is also possible to conclude that private investment has an expansionary effect on 
output for all 17 countries in the sample. Figure 3 also reveals that private investment crowds-
in public investment for most countries in the sample, and crowds-out public investment in 
the cases of Belgium, and Sweden, This is an outcome quite in line with the results reported 
by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009), for the period 1960-2004.  
Table 4 provides a comparison between the results in this paper, for the period 1960-2014 
and the results of Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) covering the period 1960-2004. Therefore, the 




For the cases where such comparison is feasible, Table 4 makes it possible to draw some 
additional results, for the period 1960-2014 vis-à-vis the period before the crisis. Regarding 
the marginal productivity of public investment, there was an increase in nine countries, while 
the marginal productivity of private investment increased in seven cases between the two 
periods. In around half of the countries, the increase (decrease) in the marginal productivity of 
private or public investment takes place alongside the reduction (increase) in the investment-
to-GDP ratio. In the remaining cases that parallel is not present given the compensating 
opposite effect (vis-à-vis the investment ratio) of the change in respective the output elasticity 
to investment. 
Therefore, the total rate of return of public investment increased in three countries 
(Portugal, Denmark, and Greece) and decreased in seven countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands). In addition, the total rate of return of private 
investment increased in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and Ireland) 




In this paper we have used a VAR analysis for 17 countries OECD between 1960 and 
2014 to assess the effects of public and private investment in terms of economic growth, 
crowding out and crowding in. In that context, we also compute public and private investment 
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macroeconomic rates of return, and assessed the potential effect of the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis.  
Our results for the effects of investment shocks show that;  
i) public investment had a positive growth effect in most countries; 
ii) public investment had a contractionary effect on output in five cases (Finland, UK, 
Sweden, Japan, and Canada); 
iii) positive public investment impulses led to a decline in private investment (crowding-
out) in six countries (Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Canada, Sweden, the UK); 
iv) public investment had a crowding-in effect on private investment in the remainder 11 
countries; 
v) private investment had a positive growth effect in all countries; 
vi) private investment crowds-out public investment in the cases of Belgium, and Sweden; 
vii) private investment crowds-in public investment in the remainder 15 countries. 
Moreover, the partial rate of return of public investment is mostly positive, with the 
exceptions of Austria, Belgium, and Ireland, while the total rate of return of public investment 
is also negative in Germany and in the UK. On the other hand, the partial rate of return of 
private investment is only negative in Greece and marginally in Belgium, being the total rate 
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Appendix 1 –The analytics of the macro rates of return 
 
We compute the long-run accumulated elasticity of Y with respect to public investment, 























The partial-cost dynamic feedback rate of return of public investment, r1, is the solution 
for: 
 201(1 )r MPIpub+ = . (A3) 
The long-term accumulated elasticity of Y with respect to Ipriv can also be derived from 
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 (A6) 
And the rate of return of total investment, from an impulse to public investment, r2, is the 
solution for: 













Gross Domestic Product at current market prices, thousands national currency. 1.0.0.0.UVGD 
Price deflator of Gross Domestic Product, national currency, 1995 = 100. 
 
3.1.0.0.PVGD 








Price deflator gross fixed capital formation; total economy, national currency; 
1995 = 100. 
3.1.0.0.PIGT 
 
Nominal long-term interest rates - % 1.1.0.0.ILN 
National consumer price index - 1995 = 100 3.0.0.0.ZCPIN 
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government - 
National currency, current prices 
1.0.0.0.UTYGF; 
1.0.0.0.UTYG 
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government - 
National currency, current prices 
1.0.0.0.UTVGF; 
1.0.0.0.UTVG 






























Figure 1 – Private and public investment-to-GDP ratios, average of all countries 
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Figure 4 – Public investment: marginal productivity (horizontal) and marginal effect on 
private investment (vertical), (1960-2014) 
 
 
Note: AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEU – Germany; DNK – Denmark; ESP – Spain; FIN – Finland; FRA – 
France; GBR – United Kingdom; GRC – Greece; IRL – Ireland; ITA – Italy; JAP – Japan; NLD – Netherlands; PRT – Portugal; 
SWE – Sweden; USA – United States. 
 
Figure 5 – Private investment: marginal productivity (horizontal) and marginal effect on 
public investment (vertical), (1960-2014)  
 
 
Note: see Figure 4. 
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Table 1 – Public and private investment -to-GDP ratios 
 Public investment-to-GDP ratios Private investment-to-GDP ratios 
 1970 1980 2010 1960-14 1970 1980 2010 1960-14 
AUT 4,7 4,2 3,2 3,5 19,7 20,2 18,4 20,1 
BEL 4,8 5,3 2,2 2,7 22,3 19,7 20,1 19,3 
DEU 4,8 3,7 2,3 2,8 21,5 19,5 17,0 19,0 
DNK 4,7 3,8 3,3 3,1 20,0 16,6 14,9 17,5 
ESP 2,9 2,1 4,7 3,5 23,4 20,3 18,3 20,1 
FIN 4,2 4,3 3,7 4,1 23,5 23,0 18,2 20,6 
FRA 4,9 4,1 4,1 4,2 20,7 20,2 17,9 18,2 
GBR 6,2 3,4 3,2 2,8 17,4 18,2 12,8 16,9 
GRC 2,9 2,2 3,2 3,1 25,4 29,2 14,0 19,2 
IRL 4,2 5,7 3,4 3,2 19,3 23,3 12,4 17,8 
ITA 3,5 3,8 2,9 3,2 21,7 21,8 17,0 18,3 
NLD 6,3 4,7 4,1 4,2 22,7 18,5 15,6 18,0 
PRT 2,4 4,6 5,3 3,3 21,9 24,4 15,3 21,1 
SWE 8,3 5,4 4,5 4,9 18,6 17,7 17,7 17,8 
CAN 3,9 2,9  2,8 17,0 19,9  17,5 
JAP 4,8 5,7 3,3 4,6 32,2 25,8 16,7 22,2 
USA 5,2 4,3 4,1 4,1 15,9 19,1 13,9 17,3 
Max 8,3 5,7 5,3 4,9 32,2 29,2 20,1 22,2 
Min 2,4 2,1 2,2 2,7 15,9 16,6 12,4 16,9 
Source: EC, AMECO Database, updated on April 2015. 
 
 
Table 2 – Unit root tests, variables in first differences:  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
 
 dlog(Y) dlog(Ipub) dlog(Ipriv) dlog(tax) dir 



















Austria -5.09 -3.56 -6.44 -3.56 -6.21 -3.56 -4.50 -3.56 -9.03 -3.57 
Belgium -5-03 -3.56 -5.88 -3.59 -4.89 -3.59 -4.02 -5.59 -9.34 -3.56 
Denmark -5.28 -3.56 -6.37 -3.59 -4.99 -3.60 -5.51 -3.59 -10.61 -3.56 
Finland -4.55 -3.56 -7.48 -3.59 -4.29 -3.59 -5.53 -3.56 -6.77 -3.56 
France -3.38    -2.92 $ -4.62 -3.59 -4.36 -3.59 -4.41 -3.59 -8.40 -3.56 
Germany -5.68 -3.56 -4.46 -3.59 -4.84 -3.59 -5.57 -3.59 -9.35 -3.56 
Greece     -3.57 a     -3.50 $ -5.87 -3.59 -4.86 -3.59 -4.57 -3.59 -7.23 -3.56 
Ireland -3.66 -3.56 -3.79 -3.59 -4.37 -3.59 -5.33 -3.59 -6.56 -3.56 
Italy     -7.33 a -4.14 -6.47 -4.19 -5.06 -4.19 -6.99 -4.19 -6.55 -4.14 
Netherlands -3.58 -3.56 -5.58 -3.59 -4.51 -3.59 -5.42 -3.59 -10.17 -3.56 
Portugal -3.42     -2.92 $ -5.56 -3.59 -5.45 -3.59 -5.42 -3.59 -8.96 -3.56 
Spain -3.21     -2.92 $ -4.50 -3.59 -3.72 -3.59 -4.30 -3.59 -6.87 -3.63 
Sweden -5.49 -3.56 -6.93 -3.59 -4.32 -3.59 -4.39 -3.59 -12.04 -3.56 
UK -5.17 -3.56 -7.95 -3.59 -4.93 -3.59 -5.06 -3.59 -9.60 -3.56 
Canada -4.10 -3.56 -5.39 -3.59 -4.23 -3.64 -4.82 -3.61 -7.11 -3.56 
Japan     -5.62 a -3.56 -4.72 -3.59 -4.89 -4.18 -4.20 -3.59 -4.29 -3.56 
US -5.04 -3.56  -3.40 $ -2.93 -4.12 -3.59 -5.50 -3.59 -7.09 -3.56 
Note: critical values are for 1% level unless otherwise mentioned. 




Table 3 – Long-run elasticities, marginal productivity and rates of return (1960-2014) 
 






MPTI Total rate 
of return 
(%) 
Austria 0.019 0.525 -3.17 0.427 -4.16 
Belgium 0.007 0.275 -6.25 -0.134  
Denmark 0.045 1.436 1.83 1.148 0.69 
Finland -0.073 -1.799  -5.977  
France 0.091 2.170 3.95 2.145 3.89 
Germany 0.039 1.376 1.61 0.645 -2.17 
Greece 0.191 6.246 9.59 -0.055 2.10 
Ireland 0.002 0.078 -12.00 -0.055  
Italy 0.052 1.620 2.44 1.191 0.88 
Netherlands 0.089 2.148 3.90 1.307 1.35 
Portugal 0.073 2.231 4.09 1.383 1.64 
Spain 0.102 2.949 5.56 1.192 0.88 
Sweden -0.120 -2.446  -52.819  
United Kingdom -0.026 -0.909  0.635 -2.25 
Canada -0.315 -11.115  2.016 3.57 
Japan -0.022 -0.467  -0.409  
United States 0.302 7.396 10.52 6.193 9.55 
 






MPTI Total rate 
of return 
(%) 
Austria 0.239 1.192 0.88 1.142 0.66 
Belgium 0.170 0.883 -0.62 0.910 -0.47 
Denmark 0.181 1.034 0.17 1.000 0.00 
Finland 0.264 1.284 1.26 1.259 1.16 
France 0.312 1.719 2.75 1.599 2.37 
Germany 0.301 1.583 2.32 1.525 2.13 
Greece 0.024 0.123 -9.94 0.123 -9.94 
Ireland 0.326 1.830 3.07 1.523 2.13 
Italy 0.355 1.943 3.38 1.630 2.47 
Netherlands 0.254 1.412 1.74 1.320 1.40 
Portugal 0.319 1.512 2.09 1.397 1.69 
Spain 0.304 1.515 2.10 1.197 0.90 
Sweden 0.179 1.010 0.05 1.040 0.20 
United Kingdom 0.175 1.034 0.17 0.943 -0.29 
Canada 0.208 1.189 0.87 1.168 0.78 
Japan 0.395 1.779 2.92 1.773 2.91 
United States 0.339 1.958 3.42 1.935 3.36 
 
Notes: na – not available. The rate of return cannot be computed in this case since the marginal productivity is 
negative. MPIpub – marginal productivity of public investment. MPIpriv – marginal productivity of private 
investment. MPTI – marginal productivity of total investment. We use the average of the GDP-to-investment 





Table 4 - Marginal productivity and rates of return, 1960-2004 vs 1960-2014 
 


























PRT I 5.18 5.21 -0.9% 1.35 0.16 1.4% 
 II 2.23 0.61 1.6% 1.51 0.27 0.9% 
AUT I 1.60 2.45 -3.8% 1.45 0.07 1.5% 
 II 0.52 0.23 -4.2% 1.19 0.04 0.7% 
BEL I -0.43 -3.02 -7.4% 0.86 -0.03 -0.6% 
 II 0.27 -3.06 na 0.88 -0.03 -0.5% 
DEU I 1.72 0.53 0.6% 1.47 0.03 1.8% 
 II 1.38 1.13 -2.2% 1.58 0.04 2.1% 
DNK I 2.54 1.54 0.0% 0.95 0.04 -0.5% 
 II 1.44 0.25 0.7% 1.03 0.03 0.0% 
FIN I 0.44 0.34 -5.4% 1.06 0.02 0.2% 
 II -1.80 -0.70 na 1.28 0.02 0.2% 
ESP I 2.66 0.72 2.2% 1.56 0.18 1.4% 
 II 2.95 1.47 0.9% 1.52 0.27 0.9% 
FRA I 1.53 -0.56 6.5% 1.35 0.06 1.2% 
 II 2.17 0.01 3.9% 1.72 0.08 2.4% 
GBR I -1.62 -2.03 2.3% 1.84 0.09 2.7% 
 II -0.91 -2.43 -2.2% 1.03 0.10 -0.3% 
GRC I 2.39 1.58 -0.4% 0.91 -0.08 0.0% 
 II 6.25 3.12 2.1% 0.12 0.00 -9.9% 
IRL I -1.60 -2.77 -0.5% 1.85 0.30 1.8% 
 II 0.08 -2.40 na 1.83 0.20 2.1% 
ITA I 0.51 -0.80 4.8% 1.11 -0.34 2.7% 
 II 1.62 0.36 0.9% 1.94 0.19 2.5% 
NLD I -2.72 -2.35 3.6% 1.78 0.07 2.6% 
 II 2.15 0.64 1.3% 1.41 0.07 1.4% 
SWE I 0.13 0.40 -11.3% 1.08 -0.09 0.9% 
 II -2.45 -0.95 na 1.01 -0.03 0.2% 
CAN I -2.31 -2.30 2.9% 1.28 0.03 1.1% 
 II -11.12 -6.52 3.6% 1.19 0.02 0.8% 
JAP I 0.01 -0.99 0.8% 3.09 0.43 3.9% 
 II -0.47 0.14 na 1.78 0.00 2.9% 
USA I 1.83 -2.98 na 2.03 0.06 3.3% 
 II 7.40 0.19 9.5% 1.96 0.01 3.4% 
 
Notes: I - 1960-2004 (Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009); II - 1960-2014. na – not available. The rate of return cannot 
be computed in this case since the marginal productivity is negative. IPUB – public investment; IPRIV – private 
investment. AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEU – Germany; DNK – Denmark; ESP – Spain; 
FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GBR – United Kingdom; GRC – Greece; IRL – Ireland; ITA – Italy; JAP – 
Japan; NLD – Netherlands; PRT – Portugal; SWE – Sweden; USA – United States. 
